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ABSTRACT
e topic of fake news has drawn aention both from the public
and the academic communities. Such misinformation has the po-
tential of aecting public opinion, providing an opportunity for
malicious parties to manipulate the outcomes of public events such
as elections. Because such high stakes are at play, automatically
detecting fake news is an important, yet challenging problem that
is not yet well understood. Nevertheless, there are three generally
agreed upon characteristics of fake news: the text of an article, the
user response it receives, and the source users promoting it. Existing
work has largely focused on tailoring solutions to one particular
characteristic which has limited their success and generality.
In this work, we propose a model that combines all three charac-
teristics for a more accurate and automated prediction. Specically,
we incorporate the behavior of both parties, users and articles, and
the group behavior of users who propagate fake news. Motivated
by the three characteristics, we propose a model called CSI which is
composed of three modules: Capture, Score, and Integrate. e
rst module is based on the response and text; it uses a Recurrent
Neural Network to capture the temporal paern of user activity on
a given article. e second module learns the source characteristic
based on the behavior of users, and the two are integrated with
the third module to classify an article as fake or not. Experimental
analysis on real-world data demonstrates that CSI achieves higher
accuracy than existing models, and extracts meaningful latent rep-
resentations of both users and articles.
KEYWORDS
Fake news detection, Neural networks, Deep learning, Social net-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fake news on social media has experienced a resurgence of interest
due to the recent political climate and the growing concern around
its negative eect. For example, in January 2017, a spokesman for
the German government stated that they “are dealing with a phe-
nomenon of a dimension that [they] have not seen before”, referring
to the proliferation of fake news [3]. Not only does it provide a
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source of spam in our lives, but fake news also has the potential to
manipulate public perception and awareness in a major way.
Detecting misinformation on social media is an extremely impor-
tant but also a technically challenging problem. e diculty comes
in part from the fact that even the human eye cannot accurately
distinguish true from false news; for example, one study found that
when shown a fake news article, respondents found it “‘somewhat’
or ‘very’ accurate 75% of the time”, and another found that 80% of
high school students had a hard time determining whether an article
was fake [2, 9]. In an aempt to combat the growing misinformation
and confusion, several fact-checking websites have been deployed
to expose or conrm stories (e.g. snopes.com). ese websites
play a crucial role in combating fake news, but they require expert
analysis which inhibits a timely response. As a response, numerous
articles and blogs have been wrien to raise public awareness and
provide tips on dierentiating truth from falsehood [29]. While
each author provides a dierent set of signals to look out for, there
are several characteristics that are generally agreed upon, relating
to the text of an article, the response it receives, and its source.
e most natural characteristic is the text of an article. Advice in
the media varies from evaluating whether the headline matches the
body of the article, to judging the consistency and quality of the lan-
guage. Aempts to automate the evaluation of text have manifested
in sophisticated natural language processing and machine learning
techniques that rely on hand-craed and data-specic textual fea-
tures to classify a piece of text as true or false [11, 13, 24, 27, 28, 34].
ese approaches are limited by the fact that the linguistic charac-
teristics of fake news are still not yet fully understood. Further, the
characteristics vary across dierent types of fake news, topics, and
media platforms.
A second characteristic is the response that a news article is
meant to illicit. Advice columns encourage readers to consider
how a story makes them feel – does it provoke either anger or an
emotional response? e advice stems from the observation that
fake news oen contains opinionated and inammatory language,
craed as click bait or to incite confusion [8, 33]. For example, the
New York Times cited examples of people proting from publishing
fake stories online; the more provoking, the greater the response,
and the larger the prot [26]. Eorts to automate response detec-
tion typically model the spread of fake news as an epidemic on a
social graph [12, 16, 17, 35], or use hand-craed features that are
social-network dependent, such as the number of Facebook likes,
combined with a traditional classier [6, 18, 25, 27, 41, 45]. Unfor-
tunately, access to a social graph is not always feasible in practice,
and manual selection of features is labor intensive.
A nal characteristic is the source of the article. Advice here
ranges from checking the structure of the url, to the credibility of
the media source, to the prole of the journalist who authored it; in
fact, Google has recently banned nearly 200 publishers to aid this
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Figure 1: A group of Twitter accounts who shared the same set of fake articles.
task [37]. In the interest of exposure to a large audience, a set of
loyal promoters may be deployed to publicize and disseminate the
content. In fact, several small-scale analyses have observed that
there are oen groups of users that heavily publicize fake news,
particularly just aer its publication [1, 22]. For example, Figure 1
shows an example of three Twier users who consistently promote
the same fake news stories. Approaches here typically focus on
data-dependent user behaviors, or identifying the source of an
epidemic, and disregard the fake news articles themselves [31, 40].
Each of the three characteristics mentioned above has ambigui-
ties that make it challenging to successfully automate fake news
detection based on just one of them. Linguistic characteristics are
not fully understood, hand-craed features are data-specic and
arduous, and source identication does not trivially lead to fake
news detection. In this work, we build a more accurate automated
fake news detection by utilizing all three characteristics at once:
text, response, and source. Instead of relying on manual feature
selection, the CSI model that we propose is built upon deep neural
networks, which can automatically select important features. Neu-
ral networks also enable CSI to exploit information from dierent
domains and capture temporal dependencies in users engagement
with articles. A key property of CSI is that it explicitly outputs
information both on articles and users, and does not require the
existence of a social graph, domain knowledge, nor assumptions
on the types and distribution of behaviors that occur in the data.
Specically, CSI is composed of one module for each side of
the activity, user and article – Figure 3b illustrates the intuition.
e rst module, called Capture, exploits the temporal paern
of user activity, including text, to capture the response a given
article received. Capture is constructed as a Recurrent Neural
Network (more precisely an LSTM) which receives article-specic
information such as the temporal spacing of user activity on the
article and a doc2vec [19] representation of the text generated
in this activity (such as a tweet). e second module, which we
call Score, uses a neural network and an implicit user graph to
extract a representation and assign a score to each user that is
indicative of their propensity to participate in a source promotion
group. Finally, the third module, Integrate, combines the response,
text, and source information from the rst two modules to classify
each article as fake or not. e three module composition of CSI
allows it to independently learn characteristics from both sides
of the activity, combine them for a more accurate prediction and
output feedback both on the articles (as a falsehood classication)
and on the users (as a suspiciousness score).
Experiments on two real-world datasets demonstrate that by
incorporating text, response, and source, the CSI model achieves
signicantly higher classication accuracy than existing models. In
addition, we demonstrate that both the Capture and Score mod-
ules provide meaningful information on each side of the activity.
Capture generates low-dimensional representations of news arti-
cles and users that can be used for tasks other than classication,
and Score rates users by their participation in group behavior.
e main contributions can be summarized as:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we propose the rst model
that explicitly captures the three common characteristics
of fake news, text, response, and source, and identies mis-
information both on the article and on the user side.
(2) e proposed model, which we call CSI, evades the cost of
manual feature selection by incorporating neural networks.
e features we use capture the temporal behavior and
textual content in a general way that does not depend on
the data context nor require distributional assumptions.
(3) Experiments on real world datasets demonstrate that CSI
is more accurate in fake news classication than previous
work, while requiring fewer parameters and training.
2 RELATEDWORK
e task of detecting fake news has undergone a variety of labels,
from misinformation, to rumor, to spam. Just as each individual
may have their own intuitive denition of such related concepts,
each paper adopts its own denition of these words which conicts
or overlaps both with other terms and other papers. For this reason,
we specify that the target of our study is detecting news content
that is fabricated, that is fake. Given the disparity in terminology,
we overview existing work grouped loosely according to which of
the three characteristics (text, response, and source) it considers.
ere has been a large body of work surrounding text analysis
of fake news and similar topics such as rumors or spam. is
work has focused on mining particular linguistic cues, for example,
by nding anomalous paerns of pronouns, conjunctions, and
words associated with negative emotional word usage [10, 28]. For
example, Gupta et al. [13] found that fake news oen contain an
inated number of swear words and personal pronouns. Branching
o of the core linguistic analysis, many have combined the approach
with traditional classiers to label an article as true or false [6, 11,
18, 25, 27, 41, 45]. Unfortunately, the linguistic indicators of fake
news across topic and media platform are not yet well understood;
Rubin et al. [34] explained that there are many types of fake news,
each with dierent potential textual indicators. us existing works
design hand-craed features which is not only laborious but highly
dependent on the specic dataset and the availability of domain
knowledge to design appropriate features. To expand beyond the
specicity of hand-craed features, Ma et al. [24] proposed a model
based on recurrent neural networks that uses mainly linguistic
features. In contrast to [24], the CSI model we propose captures all
three characteristics, is able to isolate suspicious users, and requires
fewer parameters for a more accurate classication.
e response characteristic has also received aention in existing
work. Outside of the fake news domain, Castillo et al. [5] showed
that the temporal paern of user response to news articles plays
an important role in understanding the properties of the content
itself. From a slightly dierent point of view, one popular approach
has been to measure the response an article received by studying
its propagation on a social graph [12, 16, 17, 35]. e epidemic
approach requires access to a graph which is infeasible in many
scenarios. Another approach has been to utilize hand-craed social-
network dependent behaviors, such as the number of Facebook
likes, as features in a classier [6, 18, 25, 27, 41, 45]. As with the
linguistic features, these works require feature-engineering which
is laborious and lacks generality.
e nal characteristic, source, has been studied as the task
of identifying the source of an epidemic on a graph [23, 40, 46],
or isolating bots based on certain documented behaviors [7, 38].
Another approach identies group anomalies. Early work in group
anomaly detection assumed that the groups were known a priori,
and the goal was to detect which of them were anomalous [31].
Such information is not feasible in practice, hence later works
propose variants of mixtures models for the data, where the learned
parameters are used to identify the anomalous groups [42, 43].
Muandet et al. [30] took a similar approach by combining kernel
embedding with an SVM classier. Most recently, Yu et al. [44]
proposed a unied hierarchical Bayes model to infer the groups
and detect group anomalies simultaneously. ere has also been a
strong line of work surrounding detecting suspicious user behavior
of various types; a nice overview is given in [15]. Of this line,
the most related is the CopyCatch model proposed in [4], which
identies temporal bipartite cores of user activity on pages. In
contrast to existing works, the CSI model we propose can identify
group anomalies as well as the core behaviors they are responsible
for (fake news). e model does not require group information as
input, does not make assumptions about a particular distribution,
and learns a representation and score for each user.
In contrast to the vast array of work highlighted here, the CSI
model we propose does not rely on hand-craed features, domain
knowledge, or distributional assumptions, oering a more general
modeling of the data. Further, CSI captures all three characteristics
and outputs both a classication of articles, a scoring of users, and
representations of both users and articles that can be used for in
separate analysis.
3 PROBLEM
In this section we rst lay out preliminaries, and then discuss the
context of fake news which we address.
Preliminaries: We consider a series of temporal engagements that
occurred between n users with m news-articles over time [1,T ].
Each engagement between a user ui and an article aj at time t is
represented as ei jt = (ui ,aj , t). In particular, in our seing, an
engagement is composed of textual information relayed by the user
ui about article aj , at time t ; for example, a tweet or a Facebook
post. Figure 2 illustrates the seing. In addition, we assume that
each news article is associated with a label L(aj ) = 0 if the news
is true, and L(aj ) = 1 if it is false. roughout we will use italic
characters x for scalars, bold characters h for vectors, and capital
bold characters W for matrices.
story 
published
article        
published
aj
aj
ui
t
Figure 2: Temporal engagements of users with articles.
Goal: While the overarching theme of this work is fake news
detection, the goal is two fold (1) accurately classify fake news,
and (2) identify groups of suspicious users. In particular, given a
temporal sequence of engagements E = {ei jt = (ui ,aj , t)}, our
goal is to produce a label Lˆ(aj ) ∈ [0, 1] for each article, and a
suspiciousness score si for each user. To do this we encapsulate
the text, response, and source characteristics in a model and capture
the temporal behavior of both parties, users and articles, as well
as textual information exchanged in the activity. We make no
assumptions on the distribution of user behavior, nor on the context
of the engagement activity.
4 MODEL
In this section, we give the details of the proposed model, which
we call CSI. e model consists of two main parts, a module for
extracting temporal representation of news articles, and a module
for representing and scoring the behavior of users. e former
captures the response characteristic described in Section 1 while
incorporating text, and the laer captures the source characteris-
tic. Specically, CSI is composed of the following three parts, the
specication and intuition of which is shown in Figure 3:
(1) Capture: To extract temporal representations of articles
we use a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). Temporal en-
gagements are stored as vectors and are fed into the RNN
which produces an output a representation vector vj .
(2) Score: To compute a score si and representation y˜i , user-
features are fed into a fully connected layer and a weight
is applied to produce the scores vectors s.
(3) Integrate: e outputs of the two modules are concate-
nated and the resultant vector is used for classication.
With the rst two modules, Capture and Score, the CSI model ex-
tracts representations of both users and articles as low-dimensional
vectors; these representations are important for the fake news task,
but can also be used for independent analysis of users and articles.
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(a) e CSImodel specication. e Capturemodule depicts the
LSTM for a single article aj , while the Scoremodule operates over
all users. e output of Score is then ltered to be relevant to aj .
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(b) Intuition behind CSI. Here, Capture receives the temporal
series of engagements, and Score is fed an implicit user graph
constructed from the engagements over all articles in the data.
Figure 3: An illustration of the proposed CSImodel.
In addition, Score produces a score for each user as a compact
version of the vector. e Integrate module then combines the ar-
ticle representations with the user scores for an ultimate prediction
of the veracity of an article. In the sections that follow, we discuss
the details of each module.
4.1 Capture news article representation
In the rst module, we seek to capture the paern of temporal en-
gagement of users with an article aj both in terms of the frequency
and distribution. In other words, we wish to capture not only the
number of users that engaged with aj in Figure 3b, but also how
the engagements were spaced over time. Further, we incorporate
textual information naturally available with the engagement, such
as the text of a tweet, in a general and automated way.
As the core of the rst module, we use a Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN), since RNNs have been shown to be eective at captur-
ing temporal paerns in data and for integrating dierent sources
of information. A key component of Capture is the choice of fea-
tures used as input to the cells for each article. Our feature vector
xt has the following form:
xt = (η,∆t ,xu ,xτ )
e rst two variables, η and ∆t , capture the temporal paern
of engagement an article receives with two simple, yet powerful
quantities: the number of engagements η, and the time between
engagements ∆t . Together, η and ∆t provide a general of measure
the frequency and distribution of the response an article received.
Next, we incorporate source by adding a user feature vector xu that
is global and not specic to a given article. In line with existing
literature on information retrieval and recommender systems [21],
we construct the binary incidence matrix of which articles a user
engaged with, and apply the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
to extract a lower-dimensional representation for each ui . Finally,
a vector xτ is included which carries the text characteristic of an
engagement with a given article aj . To avoid hand-craed textual
feature selection for xτ , we use doc2vec [19] on the text of each
engagement. Further technical details will be explained in Section 5.
Since the temporal and textual features come from dierent
domains, it is not desirable to incorporate them into the RNN as raw
input. To standardize the input features, we insert an embedding
layer between the raw features xt and the inputs x˜t of the RNN.
is embedding layer is a fully connected layer as following:
x˜t = tanh(Waxt + ba )
where Wa is a weight matrix applied to the raw features xt at time
t and ba is a bias vector. Both Wa and ba are the xed for all xt . To
capture the temporal response of users to an article, we construct the
Capture module using a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model
because of its propensity for capturing long-term dependencies and
its exibility in processing inputs of variable lengths. For the sake
of brevity we do not discuss the well-established LSTM model here,
but refer the interested reader to [14] for more detail.
What is important for our discussion is that in the nal step of
the LSTM, x˜T is fed as input and the last hidden state hT is passed
to the fully connected layer. e result is a vector:
vj = tanh(WrhT + br )
is vector serves as a low dimension representation of the temporal
paern of engagements a given article aj received– capturing both
the response and textual characteristics. e vectors vj will be fed
to the Integrate module for article classication, but can also be
used for stand-alone analysis of articles.
Partitioning: In principle, the feature vector xt associated with
each engagement can be considered as an input into a cell; however,
this would be highly inecient for large data. A more ecient ap-
proach is to partition a given sequence by changing the granularity,
and using an aggregate of each partition (such as an average) as
input to a cell. Specically, the feature vector for article aj at parti-
tion t has the following form: η is the number of engagements that
occurred in partition t , ∆t holds the time between the current and
previous non-empty partitions, xu is the average of user-features
over users ui that engaged with aj during t , and τ is the textual
content exchanged during t .
4.2 Score users
In the second module, we wish to capture the source characteristic
present in the behavior of users. To do this, we seek a compact
representation that will have the same (small) dimension for every
article (since it will ultimately be used in the Integrate module).
Given a set of user features, we rst apply a fully connected layer
to extract vector representations of each user as follows:
y˜i = tanh(Wuyi + bu )
whereWu is the weight matrix and bu is the bias; L2-regularization
is used on Wu with parameter λ. is results in a vector represen-
tation y˜i for each user ui that is learned jointly with the Capture
module. To aggregate this information, we apply a weight vector
ws to produce a scalar score si for each user as:
si = σ (w>s · y˜i + bs )
with bs as the bias of a fully connected layer, and σ as the sigmoid
function. e set of si forms the vector s of user scores.
In principle, user features can be constructed using information
from the users social network prole. Since we wish to capture the
source characteristic, we construct a weighted user graph where
an edge denotes the number of articles with which two users have
both engaged. Users who engage in group behavior will correspond
to dense blocks in the adjacency matrix. Following the literature,
we apply the SVD to the adjacency matrix and extract a lower-
dimensional feature yi for each user, ultimately obtaining (si , y˜i )
for each user ui .
By constructing the Score module in this way, CSI is able to
jointly learn from the two sides of the engagements while extracting
information that is meaningful to the source characteristic. As with
the Capture module, the vector y˜i can be used for stand-alone
analysis of the users.
4.3 Integrate to classify
Each of the Capture and Score modules outputs information
on articles and users with respect to the three characteristics of
interest. In order to incorporate the two sources of information,
we propose a third module as the nal step of CSI in which article
representations vj are combined with the user scores si to produce
a label prediction Lˆj for each article.
To integrate the two modules, we apply a maskmj to the vector s
that selects only the entries si whose corresponding userui engaged
with a given articleaj . ese values are average to producepj which
captures the suspiciousness score of the users that engage with
the specic article aj . e overall score pj is concatenated with vj
from Capture, and the resultant vector cj is fed into the last fully
connected layer to predict the label Lˆj of article aj .
Lˆj = σ (w>c cj + bc )
is integration step enables the modules to work together to form
a more accurate prediction. By jointly training the CSI with the
Capture and Score modules, the model learns both user and arti-
cle information simultaneously. At the same time, the CSI model
generates information on articles and users that captures dierent
important characteristics of the fake news problem, and combines
the information for an ultimate prediction.
Twitter Weibo
# Users 233,719 2,819,338
# Articles 992 4,664
# Engagements 592,391 3,752,459
# Fake articles 498 2,313
# True articles 494 2,351
Avg T per article (hours) 1,983 1,808
Table 1: Statistics of the datasets.
Training: e loss function for training CSI is specied as:
Loss = − 1
N
N∑
j=1
[
Lj log Lˆ J + (1 − Lj ) log(1 − Lˆj )
]
+
λ
2 | |Wu | |
2
2
where Lj is a the ground-truth label. To reduce overing in
CSI, random units in Wa and Wr are dropped out for training.
Under these constraints, the parameters in Capture, Score, and
Integrate are jointly trained by back-propagation.
4.4 Generality
We have presented the CSI model in the context of fake news; how-
ever, our model can be easily generalized to any dataset. Consider
a set of engagements between an actor qi and a target r j over time
t ∈ [0,T ], in other words, the article in Figure 3b is a target and each
user is an actor. e Capture module can be used to capture the
temporal paerns of engagements exhibited on targets by actors,
and Score can be used to extract a score and representation of each
actor qi that captures the participation in group behavior. Finally,
Integrate combines the rst two modules to enhance the predic-
tion quality on targets. For example, consider users accessing a set
of databases. e Capture module can identify databases which
received an unusual paern of access, and Score can highlight
users that were likely responsible. In addition, the exibility of CSI
allows for integration of additional domain knowledge.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate the quality of CSI on two real
world datasets. In the main set of experiments, we evaluate the
accuracy of the classication produced by CSI. In addition, we
investigate the quality of the scores and representations produced
by the Score module and show that they are highly related to the
score characteristic. Finally, we show the robustness of our model
when labeled data is limited and investigate temporal behaviors of
suspicious users.
Datasets In order to have a fair comparison, we use two real-
world social media datasets that have been used in previous work,
Twitter and Weibo [24]. To date, these are the only publicly
available datasets that include all three characteristics: response,
text, and user information. Each dataset has a number of articles
with labels L(aj ); in Twitter the articles are news stories, and in
Weibo they are discussion topics. Each article also has a set of
engagements (tweets) made by a user ui at time t . A summary of
the statistics is listed in Table 1.
Twitter Weibo
Accuracy F-score Accuracy F-score
DT-Rank 0.624 0.636 0.732 0.726
DTC 0.711 0.702 0.831 0.831
SVM-TS 0.767 0.773 0.857 0.861
LSTM-1 0.814 0.808 0.896 0.913
GRU-2 0.835 0.830 0.910 0.914
CI 0.847 0.846 0.928 0.927
CI-t 0.854 0.848 0.939 0.940
CSI 0.892 0.894 0.953 0.954
Table 2: Comparison of detection accuracy on two datasets
5.1 Model setup
We rst describe the details of two important components in CSI:
1) how to obtain the temporal partitions discussed in Section 4 and
2) the specic features for each dataset.
Partitioning: As mentioned in Section 4, treating each time-stamp
as its own input to a cell can be extremely inecient and can reduce
utility. Hence, we propose to partition the data into segments, each
of which will be an input to a cell. We apply a natural partitioning
by changing the temporal granularity from seconds to hours.
Hyperparameters: We use cross-validation to set the regulariza-
tion parameter for the loss function in Section 4.3 to λ = 0.01, the
dropout probability as 0.2, the learning rate to 0.001, and use the
Adam optimizer.
Features: Recall from Section 4 that Capture operates on xt =
(η,∆t ,xu ,xτ ) – temporal, user, and textual features. To apply
doc2vec[19] to the Weibo data, we rst apply Chinese text seg-
mentation.1 To extract xu , we apply the SVD with rank 20 for
Twitter and 10 for Weibo, resulting in 122 dimensional xt for
Twitter and 112 for Weibo. (SVD dimension chosen using the
Scree plot.) We then set the embedding dimension so that each x˜t
has dimension 100. e SVD rank for xi for Score is 50 for both
datasets, and the dimension of Wu is 100.
5.2 Fake news classication accuracy
In the main set of experiments, we use two real-world datasets,
Twitter and Weibo, to compare the proposed CSI model with ve
state-of-the-art models that have been used for similar classication
tasks and were discussed in Section 2: SVM-TS [25] , DT-Rank [45],
DTC [6] , LSTM-1 [24], and GRU-2 [24]. Further, to evaluate the
utility of dierent features included in the model, we consider CI
as the CSI model using only textual features xt = (xτ ), CI-t as
using textual and temporal features xt = (η,∆t ,xτ ), and nally
CSI using textual, temporal, and user features. Since the rst two
do not incorporate user information, we omit the S from the name.
All RNN-based models including LSTM-1 and GRU-2 were imple-
mented with eano2 and tested with Nvidia Tesla K40c GPU. e
AdaGrad algorithm is used as an optimizer for LSTM-1 and GRU-2
as per [24]. For CSI, we used the Adam algorithm.
1hps://github.com/fxsjy/jieba
2hp://deeplearning.net/soware/theano
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Figure 4: Accuracy vs. the percentage of training samples.
Table 2 shows the classication results using 80% of entire data
as training samples, 5% to tune parameters, and the remaining 15%
for testing; we use 5-fold cross validation. is division is chosen
following previous work for fair comparison, and will be studied in
later sections. We see that CSI outperforms other models in both
accuracy and F-score. Specically, CI shows similar performance
with GRU-2 which is a more complex 2-layer stacked network.
is performance validates our choice of capturing fundamental
temporal behavior, and demonstrates how a simpler structure can
benet from beer features and partitioning. Further, it shows the
benet of utilizing doc2vec over simple tf-idf.
Next, we see that CI-t exhibits an improvement of more than 1%
in both accuracy and F-score over CI. is demonstrated that while
linguistic features may carry some temporal properties, the fre-
quency and distribution of engagements caries useful information
in capturing the dierence between true and fake news.
Finally, CSI gives the best performance over all comparison
models and versions. We see that integrating user features boosts
the overall numbers up to 4.3% from GRU-2. Put together, these
results demonstrate that CSI successfully captures and leverages
all three characteristics of text, response, and source, for accurately
classifying fake news.
5.3 Model complexity
In practice, the availability of labeled examples of true and fake
news may be limited, hence, in this section, we study the usability
of CSI in terms of the number of parameters and amount of labeled
training samples it requires.
Although CSI is based on deep neural networks, the compact set
of features that Capture utilizes results in fewer required parame-
ters than other models. Furthermore, the user relations in Score
can deliver condensed representations which cannot be captured
by an RNN, allowing CSI to have less parameters than other RNN-
based models. In particular, the model has on the order of 52K
parameters, whereas GRU-2 has 621K parameter.
To study the number of labeled samples CSI relies on, we study
the accuracy as a function of the training set size. Figure 4 shows
that even if only 10% training samples are available, CSI can show
comparable performance with GRU-2; thus, the CSI model is lighter
and can be trained more easily with fewer training samples.
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Figure 5: Distribution of `i over users marked as high and
low suspicion according to the s vector produce by CSI.
5.4 Interpreting user representations
In this section, we analyze the output of Score which is a score si
and a representation y˜i for every user. Since the available data does
not have ground-truth labels on users, we perform a qualitative
evaluation of the information contained in (si , y˜i ) with respect to
the source characteristic of fake news.
Although we lack user-labels, the dataset still contains informa-
tion that can be used as a proxy. In particular, we want to evaluate
whether (si , y˜i ) captures the suspicious behavior of users in terms
promotion of fake news and group behavior. For the former, a
reasonable proxy is the fraction of fake news a user engages with,
denoted `i ∈ [0, 1] with 0.0 meaning the user has never reacted to
fake news, and 1.0 meaning the engagements are exclusively with
fake news. In addition, we consider the corresponding scores for
articles as the average over users, namely pj is the average of si
and λj is the average of `i over ui that engaged with aj .
To test the extent to which (si , y˜i ) capture `i , we compute the cor-
relation between the two measures across users; Table 3 shows the
Pearson correlation coecient and signicance. For both datasets
and on both sides of the user-article engagement, we nd a sta-
tistically signicant positive relationship between the two scores.
Results are consistent for the Spearman coecient and for ordi-
nary least squares regression(OLS). In addition, Figures 5a and 5b
show the distribution of `i among a subset of users with highest
and lowest si . Most of the users who were assigned a high si by
CSI (marked as most suspicious) have `i close to 1, while those
with low si have low `i . Altogether, the results demonstrate that si
and pj hold meaningful information with respect to user levels of
engagement with fake news.
User Article
Twitter 0.525*** 0.671***
Weibo 0.485*** 0.646***
Table 3: Correlation between `i and y˜i with statistical signif-
icance as *< 0.1, **< 0.05, and ***< 0.01.
To investigate the relation of y˜i to `i , we regress the cosine
distance between y˜i and y˜i′ against the dierence between `i and
`i′ for each pair of users (i, i ′). Consistent with results for si , we nd
a positive correlation of 0.631 for Twitter and 0.867 for Weibo,
both of which are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Further, we
visualize the space of user representations by projecting a sample
of the vectors y˜i onto the rst and second singular vectors µ1 and
µ2 of the matrix of y˜i ’s. Figure 6 shows the projection for both
datasets, where each point corresponds to a user ui and is colored
according to `i . We see that the space exhibits a strong separation
between users with extreme `i , suggesting that the vectors y˜i oer
a good latent representation of user behavior with respect to fake
news and can be used for deeper user analysis.
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Figure 6: Projection of user vectors zj .
Next, we analyze the propensity of (si , y˜i ) to capture group
behavior. We construct an implicit user graph by adding an edge
between users who have engaged with the same article, and by
analyze the clustering of users in the graph. We apply the BiMax
algorithm proposed by Prelic´ et al. [32] to search for biclusters in
the adjacency matrix.3 We nd that for both datasets, users with
large `i participate in more and larger biclusters than those with
low `i . Further, biclusters for users with large `i are formed largely
with fake news articles, while those for low `i are largely with true
news.
is suggests that suspicious users exhibit the source character-
istic with respect to fake news. In addition, for each pair of users
(ui ,ui′)we compute the Jaccard distance between the set of articles
they interacted with. We compute the correlation between this
quantity and |si − si′ | as well as the cosine distance between y˜i
and y˜i′ . For the former we nd a correlation of 0.36 for Twitter
and 0.21 for Weibo, and for the laer we nd 0.30 for Twitter
and 0.16 for Weibo. All results are signicant at the 1% level, with
Spearman correlation and OLS giving consistent results.
Overall, despite lack of ground-truth labels on users, our analysis
demonstrates that the Score module captures meaningful informa-
tion with respect to the the source characteristic. e user score
si provides the model with an indication of the suspiciousness of
user ui with respect to group behavior and fake news engagement.
Further, the y˜i vector provides a representation of each user that
can be used for deeper analysis of user behavior in the data.
3BiMax available here hp://www.kemaleren.com/the-bimax-algorithm.html
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Figure 7: Distribution (CDF) of user lags on Twitter andWeibo.
5.5 Characterizing user behavior
In this section, we ask whether the users marked as suspicious by
CSI have any characteristic behavior. Using the si scores of each
user we select approximately 25 users from the most suspicious
groups, and the same amount from the least suspicious group.
We consider two properties of user behavior: (1) the lag and (2)
the activity. To measure lag for each user, we compute the lag in
time between time between an article’s publication, and when the
user rst engaged with it. We then plot the distribution of user lags
separated by most and least suspicious, and true and fake news.
Figure 7 shows the CDF of the results. Immediately we see that
the most suspicious users in each dataset are some of the rst to
promote the fake content – supporting the source characteristic. In
contrast, both types of users act similarly on real news.
Next, we measure the user activity as the time between engage-
ments user ui had with a particular article aj . Figure 8 shows the
CDF of user activity. We see that on both datasets, suspicious users
oen have bursts of quick engagements with a given article; this
behavior diers more signicantly from the least suspicious users
on fake news than it does on true news. Interestingly, the behavior
of suspicious users on Twitter is similar on fake and true news,
which may demonstrate a sophistication in fake content promotion
techniques. Overall, these distributions show that the combination
of temporal, textual, and user features in xt provides meaningful
information to capture the three key characteristics, and for CSI to
distinguishing suspicious users.
5.6 Utilizing temporal article representations
In this section, we investigate the vector vj that is the output of
Capture for each article aj . Intuitively, these vectors are a low-
dimensional representation of the temporal and textual response an
article has received, as well as the types of users the response has
come from. In a general sense, the output of an LSTM has been used
for a variety of tasks such as machine translation [36], question
answering [39], and text classication [20]. Hence, in the context
of this work it is natural to wondering whether these vectors can
be used for deeper insight into the space of articles.
As an example, we consider applying Spectral Clustering for a
more ne-grained partition than two classes. We consider the set
of vj associated with the test set of Twitter and Weibo articles,
and set k = 5 clusters according to the elbow curve. Figure 9 shows
the results in the space of the rst two singular vectors (µ1 and µ2)
of the matrix formed by the vectors vj for each respective dataset,
with one color for each cluster.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of true and false articles in each
cluster. We can see that the results gives a natural division both
among true and fake articles. For example, on the Twitter datasets,
while both C2 and C4 are composed of mostly fake news, we can
see that the projections of their temporal representation are quite
separated. is separation suggests that there may be dierent
types of fake news which exhibit slightly dierent signals in the text,
response, and source characteristics, for example, satire and spam.
e Weibo data shows two poles: C1 in the top le corresponds
largely to true news, while C2 and C4 captures dierent types of
fake news. Meanwhile, C3 and C5 which are spread across the
middle, have more mixed membership.
In the context of the general framework described in Section 4,
the results show that the vj vectors produced by the Capture mod-
ule oer insight into the population of users with respect to their
behavior towards fake news. Aside from the classication output of
the model, the representations can be used stand-alone for gaining
insight about targets (articles) in the data.
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Figure 9: Article clustering with vj on Twitter andWeibo.
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Figure 8: Distribution (CDF) of user activity on Twitter andWeibo.
Twitter Weibo
Cluster True False Cluster True False
1 16 17 1 362 5
2 5 33 2 16 326
3 46 2 3 45 10
4 3 16 4 0 72
5 11 8 5 28 37
Table 4: Cluster statistics forTwitter andWeibo for Figure 9.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the timely problem of fake news detection.
While existing work has typically addressed the problem by fo-
cusing on either the text, the response an article receives, or the
users who source it, we argue that it is important to incorporate
all three. We propose the CSI model which is composed of three
modules. e rst module, Capture, captures the abstract tempo-
ral behavior of user encounters with articles, as well as temporal
textual and user features, to measure response as well as the text.
e second component, Score, estimates a source suspiciousness
score for every user, which is then combined with the rst module
by Integrate to produce a predicted label for each article.
e separation into modules allows CSI to output a prediction
separately on users and articles, incorporating each of the three
characteristics, meanwhile combining the information for classi-
cation. Experiments on two real-world datasets demonstrate the
accuracy of CSI in classifying fake news articles. Aside from accu-
rate prediction, the CSI model also produces latent representations
of both users and articles that can be used for separate analysis; we
demonstrate the utility of both the extracted representations and
the computed user scores.
e CSI model is general in that it does not make assumptions on
the distribution of user behavior, on the particular textual context
of the data, nor on the underlying structure of the data. Further,
by utilizing the power of neural networks, we incorporate dier-
ent sources of information, and capture the temporal evolution of
engagements from both parties, users and articles. At the same
time, the model allows for easy incorporation of richer data, such
as user prole information, or advanced text libraries. Overall our
work demonstrates the value in modeling the three intuitive and
powerful characteristics of fake news.
Despite encouraging results, fake news detection remains a chal-
lenging problem with many open questions. One particularly inter-
esting direction would be to build models that incorporate concepts
from reinforcement learning and crowd sourcing. Including hu-
mans in the learning process could lead to more accurate and, in
particular, more timely predictions.
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